The Nature of Rationality Review
(Book Review-Kitap Tanıtımı)

Yıldız KARAGÖZ YEKE
Prof. Dr., Cumhuriyet Univ. Edebiyat Fakültesi
Prof., Cumhuriyet Univ. Faculty of Letter
Orcid 0000-0001-8546-8216
ncaliskan@beyza.net

Robert Nozick’s *The Nature of Rationality* integrates audiences from a range of disciplines in a bid to address the social and ethical challenges that matter in the modern society. The author presents a valuable philosophical conversation based on free flow of ideas founded from the argument structures of the modern philosophy. Nozick’s primary subject incorporates rationality in decision and rationality in belief as well as in preferences. The author’s task to discuss the evolutionary sensitive account of rationality provides interesting and suggestive work that makes far-reaching propositions.

At the onset, the author introduces the concept of the functions of principles, including intellectual, personal, practical, and interpersonal. In embracing the principle, people tend to make their actions symbolize something aside from itself, mostly for all the class actions. Individuals assign to the single action of utility linked with the other outcome of class being performed. or even offer evidence for the anticipated result (Stephen, 1992). To that end, people tend to focus on a recognizable connection neither casual decision nor theory of evidential decision. Nozick believes that the appreciation of this fact will lead us to the new rational conception of choiceworthiness, which incorporates the
insights of evidential decision theory and causal decision theory and adds to the theory of symbolic utility. According to Nozick, the rational action make best use of decision value (DV) often determined by the weighted sum of the causal, evidential, and symbolic utilities. Actions can offer indication for a state of affairs and an adequate model of rational choiceworthiness provides positive weight to the very connections.

The advocates of causal decision theory and those in the evidential decision theory side, however, may question the motives of the strategy of inclusion Nozick write about. As such, the book introduces the puzzle of the decision theory referred to as the Newcomb’s problem. The author notes that individuals that believe in taking two boxes in the primary puzzle often to the change their mind if the amount of money in the second box is significantly reduced. Nozick claims, the phenomena hints that no human have complete confidence he or she follows (Nozick, 2001, p. 45). Even though this notion appears plausible, Nozick’s suggestion that if humans go further and indicate the uncertainty about the specific principle is correct means that they are legitimate and each must be accorded its corresponding due (Christensen, 1995). However, at this point, partisans will part ways with the author. The use of a weighed sum of causally predictable utility along with its anticipated evidentially expected utility to describe as well as predict the decision of individual would also mean foreseeing faults in concrete reasoning. More surprising, Nozick fails to talk about such critics, but reminds those that might ignore his notion of evidentially expected utility that evidential considerations have experienced significant social consequences in the history of humans along with the literature of Calvinism (Nozick, 2001, p. 46). Further, he reminds the audience that specific circumstances that align with causal decision theory adopt evidential theory. Clearly, a benevolent understanding of the author’s strategy requires the readers to see him as appealing to us to observe the rational choice.
in different avenues, yet he provides little reasoning to look the invitation attractive.

Even though discussing the subject of rational belief and credibility, Nozick incorporates the theory of the main topic. Indeed, suppose the beliefs are taken as actions, it is possible to use the decision theory to establish the specific beliefs that would remain most rational to adopt, at least from a practical perspective. Nonetheless, according to Pascal’s wager, a rational belief in this understanding might fail to be rational belief in an epistemic viewpoint that coincides with the subject of epistemology (Cohen, 1991). Nozick differentiates such senses of rationality by using the example of a mother given evidence that the son has committed a law-breaking act, which makes his fault increasingly dependable compared to his innocence. In this case, believing his innocence would be a rational thing to do, since she imagines that his guilt might be painful to her. The author’s account of rational belief is founded on two pillars, namely the credibility hypothesis of the various candidates and the measure of epistemic appraisal. However, Nozick’s use of the novel measure of explanatory as modeled by Baye’s theorem remains unclear and subjective. The final chapter of the book assesses the moral standing of markets, such as the customer’s freedom and the owners freedom (Nozick, 2001, p. 146).

In conclusion, the book, The Nature of Rationality puts forward significant ideas that play major roles in our lives, such as the principles that act a defense of the property. The author further incorporates the concept of evolution rationality because Nozick brings together two wings of reasoning grounded on contingent factual relations and \textit{priorti} relations. The wealth of ideas in the book attempts to share positive philosophical suggestions and contribute to intelligence and imagination. Nonetheless, a significant drawback is the argumentation that short of careful and detailed consideration to both ends of the philosophical conversation debate. Overall, many readers may find
Nozick’s work lively and find the suggestions explored and defended in a significant detail.

References


