
Abstract

The United Nations is exemplified when defining an international organization or discussing the components of a liberal world order. This reference is made based on both organization’s size and sphere of influence and the key roles on settling disputes and promoting peace and security. When assessed in the context of foreign policy, the said responsibilities require the presence of leaders for effective implementation of perpetual peace-based strategies and tactics on behalf of the United Nations. In this context, traditional mindset considers Secretaries-General to be responsible agents of the aforementioned issues. Revealing their strategic culture will provide an understanding about UN’s overall propensity to promote peace. Therefore, analyses of Secretaries-General were made by applying an automated content analysis method. A quantitative analysis will help readers see to what extent liberal mindsets exist in their foreign policy preferences and to what extent such mindset play a role in promoting peace and security.

Keywords: United Nations, Secretary-General, Operational Code Analysis, Liberal World Order, Content Analysis
Introduction

International Organizations, from past to present, have kept a place at the center of international relations. Capacity of these organizations is foremost important to measure the level of effectiveness they have. Such measurement includes variety of dependent and independent factors, one of which is a leadership. Different types of leadership may result in implementation of different factors. In this sense, a research shall try to locate the mindset, namely the belief system of a leader to see what the underlying causes of the policy making process by a particular leader are. This paper will ask following questions to design such a research: What are the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of a leader? Is s/he leaning towards a cooperative or conflictual strategy while adopting an approach? How does s/he react with his/her engagement with different political actors? These questions will set a ground to reveal a mindset of a leader. As a starting point, United Nations (UN) is chosen since it has the upmost capacity because of some below-given practical reasons. Within this context, United Nations Secretary Generals (UNSGs) are, though not the head of the organization, are the leaders this paper focuses as the primary administrative actors of the UN. Therefore, their operational code analysis will help the reader to see what kind of propensities they have and what type of leadership it has resulted. Answering above questions for UNSGs will exhibit their foreign policy preferences and tactics and will contribute to the literature of International Organizations and field of UN which has been understudied within the International Relations discipline.

In the first section, I will try to bridge between theoretical background and operational code analysis in terms of UNSGs. Next section will provide reader the literature on op-code analysis and what kind of measurement tools paper has adopted. Subsequent sections will explain the hypotheses, research design and how I interpret the results. As concluding remarks, the relation between results and hypotheses will be explained and yield the floor for further academic research on the issue.

Theory

Traditional conflict between Liberal and Realist approaches of International Relations has drawn huge amount of attendance in academia. John Herz tried to explain the above given conflict in hundred pages. Issues that are prioritized by both approaches differ and the way scholars interpret them result in different perspectives trying to explain international order, peace and security. In this paper, it is argued that Liberalism has some advantages over Realism. First it has more ability to predict progressive change in the history of international relations. Second, it shapes more substantive content of foreign policy. Third it considers human being as important rational actors who are neglected by Realists (Moravcsik 1992, 1). The third point is an advantage for us since the proper evaluation of international system...
cannot be made by only focusing on states and state structures but also by considering humans as rational decision makers and policy shapers.

Though it is not in the scope of this paper, a proper test of liberal theory or at least an explanation of it is necessary to proceed. According to Moravcsik, such a test is not a kind of method applied to predict the state behavior based on preferences of just one state (Moravcsik Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 1997). It should rather be a prediction based on preferences of all states in international society. This is what we call “state behavior in international context”. Two things are important in Moravcsik’s argument. First he departs from state centric structure to explain a method and he gives importance to international society. So, if it is assumed that states are the fundamental actors in the international system, then a possible grouping between them may have the potential to bring more constitutive structure to international arena. Liberals, in this sense, think that international institutions do matter. Actually, it was Hugo Grotius who conceptualized what we call today “international law” and became one of the early thinkers of international system. He sought to explain just causes of war (jus ad bellum) and just conduct in war (jus in bello) (Roberts 2008, 932). This theory he conceptualized has an influence on current politics. According to Meierhenrich (2012), most states feel the obligation to create rules of international society since states are as sociable as individuals. It should be noted that this view of Meierhenrich went against Hobbesian dynamics Realist thinkers count on and claims that despite anarchy in international arena, states could come up with perpetual peace and create an open international society. Kant, one of the significant contributors of Liberalism, argues that democracy, economic institutions and international organizations are significant for perpetual peace. According to Wilsonianism, international organizations are perceived to be the “promoters of peace and well-being” (Meierhenrich 2012, 14). If the history of international organizations is examined, parallel Liberal views will definitely be revealed.

One should add also that Liberal perspectives are enriched by pluralist views. Not by overturning Realism, pluralist views focus on international organizations in addition to states. Thus, international institutions have been defined as facilitators of cooperation among states. Assuming that cooperation also results in peace, Russett and Pevehouse put forward that membership in international organizations definitely contributes to international peace and security (Pevehouse & Russett 2006, 969). They also claim that particular types of international organizations encourage peaceful relations among their members since they are seen as contributors of dispute settlement processes because of their mediatory role. Additionally, international organizations could easily spread common norms and values that may result in trust-building between member states.
Most of the above-given concepts and frameworks about international organizations are also shared by neo-liberal institutionalists. They think that international institutions play a key role to foster cooperation between states. Unlike Realists, they believe in the possibility of governance even though there are no coherent mechanisms of global government. By saying governance, neo-liberal institutionalists imply norms, rules and institutions. Institutions may play different roles and formal mechanisms to settle disputes may belong to such institutions like United Nations Security Council. This paper indeed will focus on United Nations as the foremost international organization which brings almost all of the states recognized in international arena together. The liberalist approach in the creation of the United Nations advocates for free or liberal membership of the member states and exercising of individual government sovereign powers to achieve international cooperation (Daws & Weiss 2008, 4). Diplomacy, as a liberal tool, has been encouraged to settle disputes and promote peace within the UN. Though there are major criticisms about the nature of the United Nations in different circles, this paper will proceed based on the above given information about it.

It is discussed in the literature that leader’s op-code beliefs are consistent internally with one another. In line with this argument, as also George and Holsti does, one might claim that there is a consistency in behaviors of actors. This is stated in cognitive consistency theory. However, the scope of this research reveals two arguments that could contradict with cognitive consistency theory. First, UN is an international organization in which so many states have the right to act in line with their own national interests. This is important because unlike the leaders of sovereign states, secretary-generals are more inclined to manage and maintain negotiation between state parties and have the responsibility to consider interests of an entire organization rather than a single nation. Second, since these people are representing an international organization which is assumed to be the responsible body for peace and security in the world, secretary generals are assumed to think twice before coding a belief and hold a mediatory position.

**Conceptualization of Literature**

One of the earliest works in the field of Operational Code Analysis is Nathan Leites’ analysis on Politburo, which was published in 1951 (Leites 1951). He was trying to reveal Bolshevik mentality, but his work was in a way introduced as a piece contributing to behavioral approach for political leadership studies. George (1969), by introducing this early work in his article, discusses the cognitive limits on decision making, the philosophical content of an Operational Code, and the instrumental beliefs in Operational code. While elaborating on these, he uses Bolshevik answers as examples. The reason why this is a good piece of work is that it approaches to the topic by analyzing goal-selection processes and risk-calculations in the minds of
political actors and showing how a belief-system is shaped; so that readers can grasp the logic behind Operational Code analysis. Walker (1990) is an important author furthering the op-code studies by summarizing the evolution that op-code has gone through and adding —will be presented below-on them.

The belief system is a very important dimension for op-code. Walker (2000), takes George’s work one step further and demonstrates the relation between a belief system and its role in behavior. Op-code is defined as a bridge between these two. It is also important to see how op-code analysis evolved into a tool for leadership assessment. Starting from cognitive consistence theory, he explains the stages and introduces Verbs in Context System.

In another work of Walker, co-authored with Schafer and Young (1998), though he is not the first person to introduce this, explains leader’s diagnosis of the political universe and choice propensities. These are the questions

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2 It is a set of techniques to retrieve belief patterns from a leader’s public statements and to draw inferences about public behavior which are compatible with these beliefs (Walker, 2000).
used in order to identify leaders’ operational code as a “belief system”. Quoting from Holsti’s work:

**Philosophical issues**

1. What is the ‘essential’ nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
4. How much control or mastery do self and other have over historical development? What is self and other’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

**Instrumental or policy issues:**

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled and accepted?
4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest?
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest? (1970)

Alexander George forms these two sets of questions to get answers about leader’s view on political universe, role s/he plays and strategies s/he should pursue in the exercise of power (1969). Holsti, based on what George had conceptualized constructed a typology of operational code. He indicated six operational codes, namely A-B-C-D-E-F, which later on re-designed by Walker to four codes, namely A-B-C-DEF (1983; 1990). Holsti’s work was derived from leader’s master beliefs which are the answers to three of 10 questions: P-1, I-1 and P-4. Verbs in Context System which is an automated content-analysis system, mentioned above, is the contemporary method used in operational code analysis. This method determines patterns of leader’s beliefs from statements (Walker et al. 1998). Schafer and Walker developed further analysis in the field on preference orderings. With the outcomes of settlement, deadlock, domination and submission, they introduce Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP). Outcomes are derived from the master beliefs of leaders in the TIP. Scores for master beliefs are compared with the average scores for the norming group composed of 35 different world leaders and their 164 speeches. This comparison is expected to demonstrate if a leader’s strategy is conflict or cooperation.
More recent works in the field present significant aspects as well. Malici and Buckner (2008), in his article “Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Assad” looks at regional perspectives with specific importance to cognitive diagnostic beliefs of the two mentioned leaders. Malici, in his another piece (2006), examines the effects of foreign policy culture on behaviors. He is trying to look at cultural patterns for policy making processes in Germany.

Hypotheses

To test the strategic culture, namely belief systems of United Nations Secretary Generals, this paper employ operational code analysis. This test is being operated to see whether the UNSGs are reflecting the values and nature of the United Nations explained in accordance with liberalist approaches given above or not. Herein, UNSGs, as representatives of United Nations to all Member States (MS), will be accounted with their adherence to liberal norms and values the organization incorporates. To this end;

**Hypothesis 1:** Considering the internal and external consistency in a leader’s belief system, UNSG carries liberalist mindset on international institutions’ role to promote peace and act in accordance with that end.

UNSG is kept responsible for substantial amount of duties. According to United Nations principles, s/he has to advocate for the moral authority and values of United Nations and act for peace. It could be deduced from the previous statement that United Nations keep itself responsible for some tasks that include peace settlement via assigning Secretary Generals. Alliances and friendships may be considered important to this end for them. Therefore;

**Hypothesis 2:** As liberals, UNSGs political beliefs reflect friendlier image of the political universe than other political leaders in the world.

So, it is undeniable that UNSGs also play a role in international arena. They are the “symbols of the United Nations ideals and spokesmen for the interests of the world’s peoples”. Such a role, both in theory and in practice, requires an adequate level of optimism not to lose hopes for the future. In this point;

**Hypothesis 3:** As liberals, UNSGs image of the political universe is optimistic about the prospects for realizing fundamental political goals.

The office of SG also makes it vital for SGs to travel around the world and create channels of communication with the people. Thus, they may be able to build bridges between different societies and prepare field-based reports for General Assembly or Security Council to grab attention to the problems of those people. Communication is a prerequisite for cooperation for SGs. Also, another vital role that they play is their use of “good-offices”. It means, according to UN, “steps taken publicly and in private, drawing upon his
independence, impartiality and integrity to prevent international disputes from arising, escalating or spreading”. These steps, as indicated above, do not involve use of force, instead require necessity to implement diplomatic measures through communication channels. Therefore;

**Hypothesis 4:** As liberals, UNSGs instrumental beliefs reflect a propensity to employ diplomatic means rather than employing force to achieve political goals.

One thing that is not mentioned about SGs is their capacity to influence historical development in international arena. It shall first be mentioned that UN Charter makes UNSGs responsible for bringing any issue which s/he thinks threatening the international peace and security to the attention of Security Council. Likewise, they have the responsibility to notify the General Assembly for the related matters. They perform these duties since they are the chief administrative officers of the organization. By doing so, they mobilize the most integrated bodies of the United Nations to promote peace and security. UNSGs are also assigned for the Chairman of the UN System Chief Executives Board for Cooperation. By leading the meetings, SG specializes in coordination and cooperation of MS'. So;

**Hypothesis 5:** The belief of SGs in the ability to control historical development shall be higher when compared to other political leaders of the world.

**Research Design**

**Method**

This research was planning to use “Profiler Plus v. 5.8.4” software in accordance with Operational Code Scheme which is defined in Verbs in Context System. Software is provided by Social Science Automation, Inc. However, due to license problems, Michael Young – the president and co-founder of Social Science Automation- offered us to use “profilerplus.org” to analyze data sets. Therefore, coded speeches have been analyzed online. Based on the results given by the web site (I-1, I-2, P-1, and P-2), I will proceed to next sections of my research.

**Data**

The data was collected from the official web sites of United Nations, United Nations library and archives and Kofi Annan Foundation. Since official web site of UN is up to date, finding Antonio Guterres, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon’s speeches was not a difficult process. When it comes to former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the scope of the speeches collected from online databases and web sites are narrower than the others. At this point, a detailed research has been made in UN archives and coded speeches of Boutros-Ghali founded. Based on UN sources, this research gives
credibility to the coded speeches of the 4 SGs and finds them reliable sources to be analyzed on “profilerplus.org”.

This research is composed of 21 speeches of Boutros-Ghali (27072 words), 23 speeches of Kofi Annan (42792 words), 15 speeches of Ban Ki-moon (15235 words), and 23 speeches of Antonio Guterres (39940).

**Measurement**

Criteria for measurement of these comparisons are following: *the nature of the political universe, prospects for realizing fundamental values, control over historical development, and direction of strategy* (Schafer & Walker 2006, 32-38). The indices used for these criteria will be provided below. Before proceeding to the conduct of the study, the reason why these criteria are chosen in the scope of this research should be clarified.

Every leader has an image of other actors, their policies and actions. It is assumed that this image reflects his/her beliefs about the nature of the political universe (P-1). What is assumed in H2, is that they reflect friendlier image in this sense rather than being mixed or hostile. It is essential to evaluate the prospects for the eventual realization of secretary generals’ fundamental political values in order to see whether they are optimistic or pessimistic (P-2). Since this research gives importance to the mediatory role of secretary generals, an optimistic nature to realize goals could be associated with them. Nevertheless, test results will demonstrate the explicit answer for this. Connected with the realization of goals, choosing the direction of strategy for the political action is also another matter of importance since to know how an individual optimize his/her own strategy to assess the success of policies pursued (I-1). The logic behind this point is that the more leader talks about self the more s/he define his/her actions cooperatively and vice versa. Lastly, this research is also interested in analyzing to what extent a leader sees him/herself as being in control in the political universe (P-4). Logic is not difficult. If the subject of the analysis’ results show that self takes place in most of the action then self is seen in control by the self. If others are more frequent in the analysis, then self is meant to control others. The results obtained from op-code analysis will demonstrate whether this is true or not.
United Nations Secretary Generals as Liberal Agents: An Operational Code Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P-1. Nature of the Political Universe (Friendly/Hostile)</th>
<th>0.4682</th>
<th>0.452</th>
<th>0.4118</th>
<th>0.4161</th>
<th>0.4388</th>
<th>0.301</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-2. Realization of Political Values (Pessimistic/Optimistic)</td>
<td>0.2482</td>
<td>0.2436</td>
<td>0.2055</td>
<td>0.1955</td>
<td>0.2244</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3. Predictability of Political Future (Low/High)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-4. Control Over Historical Development (Low/High)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Self's Control</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Other's Control</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-5. Role of Chance</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Instrumental Beliefs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals (Cooperative/Conflictual)</th>
<th>0.7266</th>
<th>0.5571</th>
<th>0.7415</th>
<th>0.6429</th>
<th>0.6444</th>
<th>0.401</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-2. Tactical Pursuit of Goals (Cooperative/Conflictual)</td>
<td>0.3429</td>
<td>0.2445</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.2952</td>
<td>0.2904</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-3. Risk Orientation (Averse/Acceptant)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-4. Timing of Action</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Cooperation/Conflict</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Words/Deeds</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-5. Utility of Means</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reward</td>
<td>0.63*</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.62*</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Promise</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Appeal/Support</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
<td>0**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Oppose/Resist</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Threaten</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant differences are at the following levels (two-tailed test): *p<0.001, **p≤0.05, ***p≤0.4

Table 1: Operational Code of United Nations Secretary Generals
Results

Results, listed above, will be analyzed in their own nature and in comparison with the norming group composed of 35 leaders. Starting from Boutros Boutros-Ghali, P-1 scores are all above “0”. P-1 is indicated between -1 and +1 and scores between 0 and 1 indicate that leaders’ political belief sets reflect a friendly image (Schafer & Walker 2006, 33).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the Political Universe (Hostile, Mixed, Friendly)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boutros-Ghali, with P-1 score of 0.4682 has the highest score among SGs and when compared to norming group, it has a significant difference in positive direction (0.4682 – 0.301). According to the interpretations of Walker (2000), Ghali is almost definitely friendly in his political universe. Together with the liberal perspectives attributed to him in this paper, he constitutes a good example of a friendly leader. Kofi Annan, who took the office in 2006, has a very close score to Ghali, 0.452. He is again almost definitely friendly in his political nature. Keeping in mind that Kofi Annan’s speeches have been collected both from his period during the office and the one after, there is left little doubt about whether the office affected his thoughts or not. As a person, his mindset clearly demonstrates a friendly image of the political universe. Ban Ki-Moon, whose term has just ended, is somewhat friendly. Though there is a slight difference when compared to Ghali and Annan, his score (0.4118) is nevertheless reflect friendlier image than norming group. Antonio Guterres, although his term began in January 2017 and there is not that much of a time to test his mindsets for different periods of international history, P-1 score for collected speeches of him provide again somewhat friendly image of the political universe (0.4161). All individual P-1 scores are significant at p<0.001 level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Realization of Political Values (Optimism versus Pessimism)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pessimistic</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results show that all 4 SGs are optimistic in a sense. Even if a leader see political universe as balanced, he might be less optimistic if s/he engages in more hostile deeds (33). Scores for Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan are very close to somewhat optimistic for the realization of political values. Ghali with P-2 score of 0.2482 has again the highest score among 4 SGs with Annan taking the second place only with a slight difference (0.2436). Lowest score belongs to Guterres and even he has a higher score than the norming group (0.1955 – 0.147). All P-2 scores are significant at p<0.001 level. Comparisons are slightly weaker results but significance could be claimed.
As a master belief, low significance rate of P-2 comparisons could be claimed to occur due to closer results Ban Ki-Moon and the norming group has.

I-1 Direction of Strategy (Conflict / Cooperation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Definitely</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Definitely</th>
<th>Very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>+0.25</td>
<td>+0.50</td>
<td>+0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The logic of I-1, direction of strategy, is that the more a leader has self-talks about cooperative action, the more s/he defines the direction of his/her strategy in a cooperative manner (Schafer & Walker 2006, 35). In this sense, UNSGs demonstrate generally definitely cooperative direction of strategy. Ban Ki-Moon, with highest I-1 score (0.7415), is almost close to very cooperative manner. Boutros-Ghali follows him with 0.7266. Strategic approaches of these leaders are highly cooperative. Kofi Annan, lowest of 4 SGs, when compared to norming group, reflect more cooperative means (0.5571 – 0.401). All I-1 scores of SGs and their comparison with the norming group are significant at \( p<0.01 \) level except Kofi Annan’s comparison that shall be significant at \( p<0.2 \).

P-4 Control Over Historical Development (Very Low / Very High)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third master belief, P-4 scores of SGs is pretty much around the mean of the norming group. Their own sense of control (P-4a) scores are used to find other’s control with the following equation: “1-P-4a=P-4b”. It seems that Boutros-Ghali’s own sense of control is slightly lower than the norming group (0.18 – 0.224). All three other SGs have higher scores but with tiny differences. Kofi Annan almost coincides with the norming group. Ban Ki-Moon, with the highest P-4a score (0.3) is expected to have more self historical control than other political leaders. Since this paper tries to compare the belief systems of SGs with the norming group, statistical differences are important to note, especially for such close scores obtained from the analysis. All SGs have P-4a and P-4b scores significant at \( p<0.01 \) level. However, it is hard to deny that there are significance problems for comparison tests. Although a significance level might specified in general, Kofi Annan’s score in comparison is not properly significant and cannot be said that data well supports the argument. Results need further research on them.
Figure 1: Self Values of UNSG; The origin of the coordinate system is plotted with the mean scores (I-1, P-4a) of the norming group.

Figure 2: Other Values of UNSG; The origin of the coordinate system is plotted with the mean scores (P-1, P-4b) of the norming group.

The Self and Other values of four SGs are plotted above Figure 1 and Figure 2. The origin of the coordinate system is located according to the norming group scores [(P-4a 0.224, I-1 0.401 for Self), and (P-4b 0.776, P-1 0.301 for Other)]. Results exhibit that all four SGs leadership strategies lean towards a cooperative manner while their self-control over historical development is not that high. For Other values, it must be said that SGs believe that other has a higher ability to exert control over historical development while
political nature is again peaceful for them. Plots are showing SGs positions with comparison to the norming group mean scores. From this comparison, one might argue the above given results about SGs. However, a more contemporary analysis of Self and Other values is done by Walker et al. (Walker, Malici & Schafer, Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Micro-foundations of Behavioral International Relations, 2011, p. 12). Below, I have provided the Figure 3 based on what Walker et al. conceptualizes. There are notably two differences between charts. Below chart has an axis based on $P4d$ values. Normally, $P4$ values are supposed to be between 0 and 1. What I mean from $P4$ values is $P4a$ and $P4b$. However, as Walker states, $P4d$ value is used for the axis in the below chart and its value is between -1 and +1 and found with the following formulas: for Self, $(P4a - P4b)$; for Other, $(P4b - P4a)$ (Walker Quantum Politics and Operational Code Analysis 2011, 76). Second difference lies in the origins. The origin of the coordinate system below is not scores for the norming group but (0, 0). It is assumed that such a comparison would be more beneficial but, paper aims to assess SGs within their own nature as well.

The “world of beliefs” that was developed by Walker et al. (2011, 12) is a system assessing political psychology at a distance. This system basically designed to define “state of minds” belonging to actors in their political universe. In Figure 3, there is an upper and a lower halve account for two
fundamental foreign policy strategies: Assurance and Prisoner’s Dilemma. Assurance is located in the upper halve and is said to be always positive while prisoner’s dilemma is located in the lower halve which is said to be generally negative. Each halves in the figure has four main quadrants corresponding different theoretical and practical suggestions about 4 different SGs. Starting from the Assurance part (upper halve), -from right to left- first part is Dogmatic Cooperation leadership but with a possible tendency towards Exploitation (DDE) policies against Other. Second part is Pragmatic Cooperation associated with Deter (DEE) towards Other. It is followed by Pragmatic Cooperation with a tendency of Rewarding (DDD) Other. Lastly, there is Erratic Cooperation integrates Appeasement (DED).

Prisoner’s Dilemma, lower zone, has also four quadrants about leadership. Starting from the first, –from left to right- there is Erratic Conflict strategy and Bluff (EED) tactics. Then there is Pragmatic Conflict leadership which has a Compelling tactic (EDD) against Other. Third one is Pragmatic Conflict leaders employing a policy of Punishment (EEE). Lastly, Dogmatic Conflict leaders with Bully (EDE) tactics is located.

As indicated in the Figure 3, all self-images of 4 SGs are located in Assurance part and demonstrate a tendency towards cooperation. They all have a propensity for rewarding while employing a pragmatic cooperation. Ban Ki-Moon’s I-I score (0.7415) is highest among them with Boutros-Ghali following him (0.7266). However, Boutros Ghali has the lowest score (-0.64) on historical control. Kofi Annan has slightly higher sense of historical control (-0.54) than Boutros-Ghali while his direction of strategy (0.5571) is less cooperative than all others. In terms of strategic orientation and historical control, overall mean scores for SGs share similar propensities to a large extent.

Other images of SGs shows pretty much similar results with each other with the exception of Ban Ki-Moon. Moon shows more pragmatic leadership type but his view on exerting control over historical development on Other is low when compared to other SGs. Yet they all show propensity to believe that Other is highly capable of having control over historical development. In terms of P-I values, SGs beliefs regarding Other indicate that political universe is peaceful.

Points indicating the 4 SGs are their representations for foreign policy preferences. Figure 3 clearly shows that all self-images of SGs are in the same quadrant (DDD) while images of Other fall into two separate quadrants (DEE, DDE). For self, these patterns are the signs that 4 SGs pursue strategies of cooperation; for other, patterns are the signs that 4 SGs see political universe as peaceful but with different means (Deter-Exploit).

Boutros-Ghali’s Self (+, =) and Other (+, >) values reveal that he is in favor of Assurance strategy for Self and Other. He keeps himself away from conflictual strategies. He is a conflict-averse leader. The same can also be
argued for Kofi Annan and Antonio Guterres. They are all located in upper quadrant and results show that they all employ cooperative foreign policy strategy. Their Self values are all above the mean for the norming group and within the more than one standard deviation (+, =). Their Other values exhibit the pragmatic style with exploitation (+, >). Only Ban Ki-Moon is located in pragmatic cooperation with deter (+, =) in terms of Other.

**Conclusion**

Findings have provided some hints to interpret the hypotheses given above. Results obtained from data sets help to compare SGs with the norming group. As indicated at the beginning of the paper, I come up with five hypotheses, four of which related to VICS indices, namely P1, P2, I1 and P4. Both result comparisons and TIP quadrants show that the likelihood of SGs to reflect friendly image of the political universe than other political leaders is high and well supported with the data. They see peaceful political nature for both Self and Other. It also seems that, according to two-tailed test, it is marginally significant with significance level at p<0.07. Thus, based on results and statistical analysis, I do not find any strong result confuting my hypothesis (H2).

What is written about P-2 value is that SGs image of the political universe is optimistic about the prospects for realizing fundamental goals. First of all, all leaders are plotted on “optimistic” side of the evaluation with positive results. As mentioned above, they are somewhat optimistic. Analysis exhibit that results belonging each SG statistically highly significant. When it comes to comparison with the norming group, which this paper takes as a point of comparison, it seems that all SGs have larger scores than the norming group supporting the third hypothesis. However, all data does not well support my argument. There is “significance” difference between Ban Ki-Moon and others. For Moon, there is weak evidence against the hypothesis, which might make me fail to reject the null hypothesis (H3) while others are marginally significant.

Strategic culture of leaders is also indicated by another master belief: I1. What this paper looks is whether SGs’ instrumental beliefs reflect a propensity to employ diplomatic means or not. Initial results are all clear and an important level of difference appears. They are almost close to be very cooperative in their strategic approach to goals. Accordingly, TIP scores go in parallel with them. They seem to have pragmatic cooperation leadership style with an intention to reward. They put settlement at the first rank in their preferences in a cooperative manner. They are statistically highly significant at p<0.001 level. When compared to the norming group mean scores, SGs are all employ cooperative policies rather than pursuing conflictual manner. Their scores are all plotted in upper quadrant and belong Assurance strategy. It seems very likely for them to employ diplomatic means in their strategic approach to goals. It seems that there is a
strong evidence to support my argument and I fail to reject my hypothesis (H4). Thus, SGs are said to have instrumental beliefs reflecting a propensity to employ diplomatic means rather than employing force to achieve political goals.

The ability to self’s control over historical development is another analysis-point in this paper. SGs, as chief administrative officers of the UN, are assumed to have higher historical control when compared to other political leaders. Theoretically, hypothesis (H5) is shaped according to UNSGs’ rights and responsibilities as high-ranked representatives of an international organization. Considering that P4 scores are between 0 and 1, UNSGs have low scores. Results are located between very low and low categories. As indicated in Figure 3, though they have high highly cooperative strategy, their ability to control over historical development is seemingly low for Self. Also, according to statistical analysis of data, there is weak evidence against the hypothesis. Under these circumstances, I cannot fail to reject the hypothesis (H5). They have seemingly lower sense of control. Also, dataset needs further improvement.

Lastly, what can this research conclude about the H1: Considering the internal and external consistency in a leader’s belief system, UNSG carries liberalist mindset on international institutions’ role to promote peace and act in accordance with that end. First of all, as a peace promoter, UNSG (each of four) is about to prove that they have cooperative strategy which may be easily assumed to be precondition for peaceful relations and they have a belief that they are optimist about realizing the fundamental goals according to the VICS indices. It is a significant point that this hypothesis needs qualitative assessment and further improvement with International Organization literature, yet what this research follows is quantitative analysis of a theoretical claim. In this sense, putting peace at the center, master beliefs that are related with liberalist mindset (cooperation, optimism, and friendly nature) could make me fail to reject the hypothesis.

References


